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ABSTRACT
In the past three decades, federal, state and local governments have launched an array of new
high technology development programs.  Researchers and policy-makers disagree about the
relative merits of these policies as economic development tools.  We address two questions:  (1)
Do these policies affect high technology industry employment net of location and agglomeration
factors?  (2) Do these policies interact with existing agglomeration advantages to boost high
technology industry employment?  Using a conditional change score design to examine the
effects of seven major high technology policies on the change in high technology industry
employment in metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) between 1988 and 1998, we find that two
programs--technology grant and loan programs, and technology research parks--have direct
effects net of controls for location and agglomeration factors.  All of these programs, except for
SBIRs and technology development programs, positively interact with existing agglomeration
advantages to create high technology industry employment growth.  Technology development
programs compensate for deficits in agglomeration resources.  High technology growth is an
organic, path-dependent process that depends primarily on location and agglomeration
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DO HIGH TECHNOLOGY POLICIES WORK?
AN ANALYSIS OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY EMPLOYMENT GROWTH IN U. S.
METROPOLITAN AREAS, 1988-1998
Since the early 1970s, state and local governments have launched a wide array of new economic
development programs to promote high technology development.  Popularly called “third wave,”
“new industrial” and “entrepreneurial” policies, these initiatives entail direct state intervention in
the creation of new enterprises, products, markets and technologies.  By helping to identify
market opportunities, fostering local innovation capacities, and making public investments in
new technology and private enterprises, these governmental programs have attempted to promote
“risky but potentially productive undertaking(s) that would not have gone forward without
governmental support” (Eisinger 1988: 230).  In contrast to traditional industrial recruitment
incentives that attempt to attract existing enterprise by lowering labor and other input factor
costs, these new initiatives involve direct governmental intervention in the creation of new
technology, products, markets and enterprises.  Public venture capital programs, Small Business
Innovation Research (or SBIR) programs, grant and loan programs to finance the development of
new technology, university-affiliated technology development centers, technology
deployment/transfer programs, technology business incubators, and technology research parks
are designed to create new high technology industry.
Our research addresses two questions about these programs.  First, how effective are they
at promoting high technology industry employment growth net of existing agglomeration and
location factors?  Second, do these programs magnify or compensate for agglomeration and
location factors, including existing high technology industry?
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We take a regional perspective by examining the growth of high technology industry
employment in metropolitan areas (MSAs) in the U.S. between 1988 and 1998.  Several large
MSAs, like Chicago, Illinois, Washington, D.C., Boston, Massachusetts, and San Jose,
California started this decade with major high technology concentrations that continued to grow.
Others, like Los Angeles, California, Detroit, Michigan, and Seattle, Washington had large high
technology sectors, which declined.  Other smaller MSAs, like Wichita, Kansas, Austin, Texas,
Dayton-Springfield, Ohio, and Raleigh-Durham, N.C., began with small high technology sectors
but grew rapidly.  Our major concern is whether the high technology development policies
adopted by state and local governments helped create this high technology industry employment
growth.
Policymakers and the general public treat employment and jobs as the central yardstick
for evaluating these programs.  The primary rationale for these “high tech” programs is that they
create quality jobs.  High technology also has significant spillover effects on the technology and
growth of other industries (Hecker 1999; Hadlock, Hecker and Gannon 1991; Zachariadis 2002),
and is critical to the economic competitiveness of specific regions and nations in an increasingly
global economy (National Science Board 1998: Ch. 6; Fujita, Krugman and Venables 1999;
Atkinson and Gottlieb 2001; Devol, Koepp and Fogelbach 2002; Harchaoui, Tarkhani, Jackson
and Armstrong 2002).  As we show below, wages in high technology industries are typically
thirty to forty percent higher than in other industries (see also Hecker 1999).  In terms of general
economic growth, labor productivity in high technology manufacturing increased between 1987
and 1999 by an average of 9.5 percent per year compared to 3.2 in the manufacturing sector as a
whole (Kask and Sieber 2002).  High technology employment was second only to human capital
as a predictor of per capita income growth in U.S. states between 1995 and 2000 (De Vol et al.
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2002).  High technology development is critical to the prosperity and economic competitiveness
of the states and communities that have invested in these new programs.  But do these high
technology programs work?
DIFFERING VIEWS ON LOCATION-SPECIFIC TECHNOLOGY POLICIES
Some analysts argue that high technology development is an organic, path-dependent
process that cannot be readily influenced by public policies (Kenney and von Burg 2000).
Others contend that conventional location factors, such as labor and housing costs, low taxes,
regulatory environments and access to transportation and markets are of limited importance
(Kenney and von Burg 2000; Florida 2002).  The major input factor in high technology
production is scientific intelligence harnessed to technical problem-solving.  Hence, in principle,
high technology industry is location-free and cannot be influenced by traditional industrial
recruitment incentives.
However, high technology industry is locality bound as it depends heavily on
interpersonal networks and the social reinforcement of entrepreneurial activities (Florida and
Kenney 1990; Saxenian 1994; Thornton 1999; Kenney and Von Burg 2000; Lee, Miller,
Hancock and Rowen 2000; Florida 2002; Kolko 2002).  High technology entrepreneurs and
workers need access to tacit and technical knowledge as well as social reinforcement for
entrepreneurial activities that are important to industrial growth in general (e.g. Sorensen and
Audia 2000) and especially to growth in high technology industries (Lee et al. 2000; Koepp
2002).  High technology firms tend to cluster geographically because of the need for information
exchange, the interpersonal transmission of tacit knowledge about business formation and
product development, localized concentrations of skilled labor, lifestyle amenities, and research
facilities associated with research universities, large corporations and federal research labs
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(Cohen, Nelson and Walsh 1996; Luger and Goldstein 1997; Branscomb and Florida 1998;
Kenney and von Burg 2000; Kolko 2002; Goldstein and Renault 2004).  Most new high
technology firms are spin-offs of other high technology firms, typically located within the same
immediate area as the parent enterprise.  Markusen, Hall and Glasmeier (1986: 154-56) found
that agglomeration effects from Fortune 500 headquarters, business services, and military R&D
affected high technology manufacturing growth in MSAs between 1973 and 1977.  Access to
venture capital is critical for converting new ideas into commercial products (Kenney and
Florida 2000; Thornton 1999; Florida 2002).  State and local high technology programs may
substitute by providing startup capital (e.g. public venture capital, SBIR funding, and technology
grants and loans), technical and management advice (e.g. business incubators, research parks),
informational networks (e.g. business incubators and research parks, networking programs) and,
perhaps more importantly, operate as catalysts for magnifying the impact of existing location and
agglomeration advantages.
Proponents of high technology policy have traditionally debated two general approaches:
(1) a centrally-directed infrastructure strategy of investing in public research and specialized
infrastructure to attract existing high technology industries to specific locations or “technopoles”
(Castells and Hall 1994); and (2) a more decentralized entrepreneurial strategy of reinforcing
local innovation capacities by investing in new enterprises and products, and promoting the
development of local networks and partnerships (Eisinger 1988; Osborne 1988; Clarke and Gaile
1989, 1998).  In the first approach, governments lower the costs of innovation by providing a
general set of resources that (in theory) existing firms and potential entrepreneurs can take
advantage of.  The assumption is that if government “builds it,” high technology entrepreneurs
“will come.”  In the second approach, governments invest directly in new enterprises and
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technology on a competitive basis and foster networking in the hope of creating a critical mass of
high-technology firms.  This approach has been popularized as a “grow your own” (Osborne
1988) or entrepreneurial strategy (Eisinger 1988; Clarke and Gaile 1989, 1998).
In the U.S., federal, state and local governments have used both strategies to provide
startup and intermediate financing, technical and managerial assistance for existing and would-be
entrepreneurs, and provided infrastructure in the form of high technology research parks,
business incubators and technology development programs.  The overlap and mix of these
programs suggests that, instead of viewing these as incompatible approaches, they might best be
seen as complementary parts of a general high technology strategy.  Public venture capital
programs and SBIRs attempt to boost local innovation capacities by facilitating existing
enterprises and would-be entrepreneurs.  Technology development and grant/loan programs
promote R&D in specific firms and industries while also increasing the overall innovation
capacity and resources of specific locales through investments in university research labs and
research centers.  Technology deployment and transfer programs promote the adoption of “state
of the art” technology.  Research parks and business incubators attempt to create “technopoles”
while also strengthening local innovation capacities.  We want to know which if any of these
policies promote high technology employment growth.
Our focus is change in high technology industry employment in MSAs between 1988 and
1998.  MSAs constitute an ideal ecological unit for evaluating these policies as well as
underlying location and agglomeration advantages.  In 1990 an MSA was defined as an
integrated labor market within a one-hour commute of a central city of 50,000 or more
population.  By mapping the location of federal, state and local high technology programs to
these MSAs, we evaluate whether these programs had an impact net of existing location and
8
agglomeration advantages and whether these programs magnify or compensate for these local
growth factors.  Several location and agglomeration factors, such as major air hubs and federal
R&D expenditures, are likely to have benefits that operate on a larger ecological scale than cities
or counties, pointing to the advantage of a focus on MSAs.
We examine decade-long change because most high technology programs, regardless of
their specifics, are focused on the startup or intermediate phases of product development.
Product development typically requires at least 5 to 10 years to move from an initial business
proposal to actual production on a scale that would measurably affect employment.
We begin with a discussion of the nature of high technology industry and its distribution
across MSAs.
HIGH TECHNOLOGY EMPLOYMENT IN METROPOLITAN AREAS, 1988-1998
High technology industry is generally defined in terms of “the design, development, and
introduction of new products and innovative manufacturing processes, or both, through the
systematic application of scientific and technical knowledge” (U.S. Congress, Office of
Technology Assessment, 1984:  8-9).  Such enterprises produce sophisticated products, use
advanced or state-of-the-art techniques, have high expenditures on research and development,
and employ a disproportionately large share of scientific, technical and engineering personnel.
What is High Technology Industry?
 Analysts have taken two general approaches to measuring the growth of high technology
industry.  An output approach focuses on the technical sophistication of an industry’s product or
the extent to which products have undergone rapid change.  The Bureau of the Census (National
Science Board 1998: 6.12-6.13), for example, used the expert judgment of industry analysts to
identify leading-edge technologies in ten product areas.  Most popular accounts of high
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technology industry (e.g. Kotkin 2001) rely on similar criteria.  However, there is little
agreement on what constitutes a sophisticated product and there is no clear way to link such
products to employment change.
A second approach is to focus on inputs to industries by examining the proportion of
workers in technology-oriented occupations or the business costs devoted to research and
development.  This approach provides objective criteria and has a direct link to employment
data.  Markusen et al. (1986) identify high technology manufacturing as industries that exceed
the manufacturing mean in the percent of scientific, technical and engineering personnel in 3-
digit SIC industries.  Hadlock, et al. (1991) improve on Markusen et al. (1986) by using the
Occupational Employment Statistics Survey (or OES) of private employers to identify the
proportion of technology workers engaged in research and development.
We use Hecker’s (1999) refinement of Riche, Hecker and Burgan’s (1983) and Hadlock,
et al’s (1991) approach that has three main advantages.1  First, it uses newer OES estimates of
scientific and technical personnel.  Second, it uses a more stringent “input” criterion of having at
least twice the industrial mean in both employment in research and development and
employment in all technology-oriented occupations.  Third, it includes services as well as
manufacturing, which is critical in view of the growing significance of high technology services.
“High technology” is thus defined as all private sector industries where employment in both
research and development and in all technology-oriented occupations is at least twice the
industrial mean.  We use Hecker’s estimates, which rely on the 1987 OES.  The OES covers all
industries except agriculture (minus agricultural services), forestry, fishing, private households
and the Federal government.  Although the exact cutoff for “high” vs. “non-high tech” industry
is ultimately arbitrary, Hecker’s definition provides a conservative objective basis for gauging
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industrial employment trends.  At the MSA level, it also overlaps closely with the industry lists
used earlier by Riche, Hecker and Hadlock (1983), Markusen et al. (1986), and Hadlock, et al.
(1991).2
We examine the first difference change in private sector employment at the MSA level in
the thirty-one 3-digit SIC industries identified by Hecker (1999).  To measure this, we use the
Current Employment Statistics Survey (or CES), compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics
from Social Security establishment unit reports (also known as the ES-202 program), which
provides the most reliable available estimate of private sector employment at the 3-digit SIC
level.  Four of our high technology industries are in services and twenty-seven are in
manufacturing.3  In 1988, there were 6.6 million high technology industry jobs inside of MSAs,
representing 74.6 percent of the national total of 8.8 million high technology industry jobs.  By
1998, high technology industry employment inside of MSAs grew to over 6.9 million jobs but,
reflecting the region diffusion of high technology industry, this constituted only 67.6 percent of
9.8 million national high technology industry jobs.  Moreover, the high technology share of jobs
in MSAs declined from 9.2 to 7.9 percent of total private sector MSA employment, reflecting the
more rapid employment growth in other industries.  Nonetheless, high technology industry
continued to be a source of “good jobs.” In 1988 the mean wage for high technology industry
jobs was $29,046 (in 1988 current $U.S.), which was 48.0 percent greater than the mean private
sector wage of $19,628.  In 1998, this high technology wage premium had declined slightly to be
36.3 percent greater than the mean private sector wage ($42,892 in current 1998 $U.S. for high
technology industry vs. $27,329 for all private sector jobs).
We analyze the 291 MSAs for which CEW employment data are available for both 1988
and 1998.  In 1990, an MSA was defined by the Census Bureau as an integrated labor market
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within a one-hour commute from a central city with at least 50,000 population (Bureau of the
Census 1991).  Due to Census revisions in the MSA list between 1980 and 1990, high
technology industry employment estimates are not available for 22 MSAs.  Eight of these MSAs
were removed from the 1980 Census list and the other fourteen MSAs were new additions.  Our
291 MSAs contain 97.04 percent of the 1990 U.S. Census estimate of the national metropolitan
population and provide the most complete set of reliable estimates of change in MSA
employment available.4
Table 1 identifies the top 20 MSAs in terms of the growth of additional high technology
industry employment between 1988 and 1998 and the top 20 MSAs in terms of the loss of high
technology industry employment.  In contrast with the conventional wisdom that advantaged
high technology areas experienced greater growth in new high technology jobs, the percent of
employment linked to high technology industry in 1988 is negatively correlated with the change
in high technology industry employment between 1988 and 1998 (r = -.144, p < .014).  This
indicates a trend toward the dispersion of high technology industry employment and a
convergence among MSAs in terms of the presence of high technology industry (for the parallel
convergence in the information-technology sector, see Kolko 2002).  As noted earlier, some
MSAs, like San Jose, California and Washington, D.C., are high technology “meccas” that had
major concentrations of high technology industry in 1988 and experienced further high
technology industry employment growth during the 1990s.  Others, like Los Angeles, California,
Detroit, Michigan, and Seattle, Washington had large high technology sectors but experienced
significant loss in high technology industry jobs.  Why?
(Table 1 about here)
OTHER EXPLANATIONS FOR HIGH TECHNOLOGY EMPLOYMENT GROWTH
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Location Theory.
 While our major interest is the effect of high technology development programs, other
explanations need to be included.  Analysts of regional development have traditionally focused
on location advantages and agglomeration effects.  Location explanations suggest that lower
input factor costs (such as wages or taxes) and central location advantages, such as access to
transportation and markets, facilitate economic development.  Irwin and Kasarda (1991) show
that centrality in the airline industry hub system contributed to economic growth and, given the
importance of rapid transit to high technology industry, we would expect airline access to
facilitate high technology development.  Similarly, central access to markets as gauged by
greater population density and interstate highway access should boost high technology
development.  Markusen et al. (1986: 155) found that a favorable climate, airline access, and
educational options in terms of the number of 4-year higher education institutions contributed to
high technology industry employment growth between 1973 and 1977.  They also found that an
increased percentage of blacks in an MSA discouraged high technology industry employment
growth, which they interpreted as reflecting racial prejudice and human capital deficits.  Other
location factors, such as higher mean wages in high technology industry and recreational and arts
amenities were not statistically significant.
Agglomeration Theory.
 Many argue that location factors are of little importance for high technology industry and
that agglomeration processes are more important.  Due to the labor-intensive nature of high
technology production and the importance of tacit knowledge (Saxenian 1994), these firms are
unlikely to achieve internal economies of scale but may achieve external economies of scale by
building business partnerships and extensive interpersonal networks among distinct firms to
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exchange technical and market information (Kenney and Von Burg 2000).  Numerous case
studies of particular high technology industries and regional high technology clusters indicate the
importance of entrepreneurial resources (such as venture capital) and a pattern of corporate spin-
offs, inter-firm personnel transfers, and collaborative business partnerships (Rogers and Larsen
1984; Saxenian 1994; Thornton 1999; Kenney and Florida 2000; Lee, et al. 2000; Cortright and
Mayer 2002).  Markusen et al. (1986) found that military R&D facilities contributed to high
technology industry job growth along with concentrations of business service firms, such as
accounting, legal and public relations firms.  Although many note that high technology
development has been greater outside the older more dense cities that were the urban centers for
earlier industrial development, human ecologists argue that greater population density sustains
high rates of social interaction and specialization, thereby promoting social and economic
innovation (Hawley 1981).  This innovation capacity should support high technology
development.  We therefore include population density as an agglomeration factor as well as a
locational advantage.
Technology Policy as a Multiplier?
 Federal, state and local entrepreneurial programs are designed to compensate for or to
reinforce agglomeration processes.  Several studies have examined the effects of particular high
technology policies but typically without comparing units with and without these policies.  Luger
and Goldstein (1991) found that over half of the high technology parks founded between 1950
and 1989 failed in the early stages and, of those that survived, less than half generated significant
total employment growth in their immediate region (mostly older parks affiliated with major
research universities that had more comprehensive service programs).  But they did not compare
counties without parks to those with parks, leaving unclear the distinctive contribution of parks
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to employment growth.  Moreover, a more relevant outcome measure would have been high
technology industry employment.  Yet this study did point to the possible importance of
proximity and ties to research universities as magnifying the effects of these parks.  In a study of
biotechnology patents, Cortright and Mayer (2002) found that university and federally funded
biomedical R&D contributes to commercialized knowledge in MSAs that also have significant
concentrations of private venture capital.  In other words, it is the conjuncture of biomedical
R&D with private venture capital that leads to biomedical patents.  Most university and federal
research does not lead to patents but the existence of favorable university policies and local
venture capital appear to be important contextual factors.  Audretsch, Weigand and Weigand
(2002) show that SBIR programs in Indiana provided small enterprise financing for a significant
number of new high technology enterprises that otherwise were unlikely to have been created.
All of these studies have the major limitation that they did not compare ecological units with and
without programs, leaving unclear the distinctive impact of high technology policies.
Two prior studies of state government high technology programs provide inconclusive
results.  Leicht and Jenkins (1994) found that state high technology policies contribute to new
firm formation but did not increase manufacturing employment, economic growth or reduce
unemployment.  Saiz (2001) found that these programs contribute to manufacturing employment
but did not influence economic growth, service sector employment or reduce unemployment.
While there are slight differences in time periods and modeling methods, the major difference
between these studies is the measurement of high technology policy.  Leicht and Jenkins (1994)
use a latent construct based on a confirmatory factor analysis of the presence of five major
programs, while Saiz (2001) uses summative scales based on the high technology attributes of
state development programs described in multiple editions of The Directory of Incentives for
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Business Investment and Development in the United States.  However, the Directory does not list
most high technology programs, which are better documented in the specialized reports used by
Leicht and Jenkins (1994) and the reports we cross-classify here.  Both studies deal with only a
short time period of 2 to 5 years to gauge employment change when a decade or more would be
more appropriate, and neither study examines change in high technology industry employment.
We examine seven programs that have been initiated by federal, state and local
governments over the past three decades to promote regional high technology development.
First, public venture capital programs provide startup, intermediate and commercialization
financing for new products and firms.  While the specific financing terms vary widely, these
programs put state government in the position of taking a royalty or ownership position in new
products and enterprises.  Some investments create equity shares in a private stock company or
royalty claims against the sales of particular products.  Others are convertible into long-term
bonds.  In the case of a business failure, some investments are converted into grants with no
repayment obligation while others remain liabilities resolved in bankruptcy proceedings.
Second, Small Business Innovation Research programs (or SBIRs) require federal
agencies that make grants for technology innovation to set aside a specified portion for small
business.  Local SBIR programs chartered by state governments administer these grant programs
and, over the past two decades, have become a significant source of federal funding for new
enterprise development (Wallsten 1998; Audretsch, et al. 2002).
Third, technology grant and loan programs provide financing for the development of
new products, typically through a competitive application process where would-be entrepreneurs
provide business plans for the commercialization of specific products.  We include in this
category tax subsidized private venture capital firms, Business Investment Development
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Companies (BIDCOs), and commercialization programs that rely exclusively on grants and
loans.
A fourth approach is technology development programs.  Typically associated with
research universities and government-industry consortia (e.g. Sematech), these programs focus
on basic and applied research to develop new products and technology.  Some are funded
directly to operate research programs while others are funded by federal and state grants and
contracts to develop new technologies and products.
Fifth, technology deployment and transfer programs focus on the utilization of “state of
the art” technology.  Taking land grant university rural extension programs as their historical
model, these programs focus on the transfer and deployment of existing “state of the art”
technology through consulting, customized labor training, technical reports, conferences and
symposia.  Some programs are administered as state agencies while others are organized as
nonprofit corporations.  Technology deployment and transfer programs typically deliver services
through contracts and direct delivery.
Sixth, high technology business incubators provide subsidized space for research and
development and, in varying degrees, technical and business advice, including assistance in
securing public and private financing.  Some incubators are state or local governmental agencies,
others are affiliated with research universities, two-year colleges, and research parks, while
others are independent nonprofit and for-profit corporations.  Incubators often have multiple
sponsors, including federal agencies and private corporations as well as state and local
government.  We include only business incubators with state and local government sponsors that
have a declared high technology focus.
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Finally, technology research parks provide subsidized long-term space for high
technology businesses along with varying degrees of business financing and
managerial/technical assistance.  Most are affiliated with research universities and typically
operate as state-chartered nonprofit corporations.  Both business incubators and research parks
typically specialize in particular technologies, attempting to foster local expertise, partnerships
and networks.
Our earlier distinction between an infrastructure and an entrepreneurial strategy should be
conceptualized as a continuum.  Business incubators, research parks and technology
development programs lie on the more centralized end, attempting to foster high technology
agglomeration by subsidizing research and development costs in specific locations.  In
comparison, public venture capital, SBIRs, technology grant and loans, and technology
deployment/transfer programs lie more on the entrepreneurial end, attempting to respond to
existing enterprises by strengthening existing local innovation capacities.  However, as noted
above, these strategies are often operationally combined with (for example) research parks
operating their own venture capital and SBIR initiatives and entrepreneurial programs favoring
local firms.
Capturing State and Local Technology Programs
Table 2 summarizes the counts of these state and local technology programs that were
operating in metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas in 1990.  We derived information on these
programs from the comprehensive listing of state government technology programs compiled by
the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology and Government (Coburn and Berglund
(1995), Luger and Goldstein’s (1991) list of technology research parks in 1990, Eisinger’s
(1991) list of public venture capital programs in 1989-90, the 1990 membership list of the
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National Association of Business Incubators (1990), Clarke (1986) inventory of state technology
programs for the National Governor’s Association, the inventory construction by the Minnesota
Dept. of Trade and Economic Development (1988), the Directory of Incentives for Business
Investment and Development in the United States published by the National Association of State
Development Agencies (1986, 1991 and 1994), and a comprehensive review of the websites of
all state technology development agencies (http://www.ncscienceandtechnology.com/
External_Programs.htm).  In 1990, business incubators were the most numerous with 137 located
inside of MSAs, followed by 99 research parks, 94 technology development programs, and 77
technology deployment/transfer programs.  Roughly two-thirds of these programs were located
inside metropolitan areas with the remainder in non-metropolitan areas.  There were significantly
fewer public venture capital, SBIR and technology grant and loan programs, reflecting the fact
that state governments typically establish only one headquarters office in or near the state capital.
(Table 2 about here)
To gauge the effects of these programs, we use the cumulative years’ duration of each
type of program in each MSA.  As Wolman and Spitzley (1996) argue, it is important to move
beyond measuring the simple presence of programs to capture policy scale.  To gauge the scale
of these programs, we summed the total years of existence of each program type within each
MSA as of 1990.  If an MSA had multiple, e.g., technology incubators, then we summed the total
years of existence for all such programs as of 1990.  While it would be ideal to have measures of
the cumulative funding for these programs and other program details, such data are not available
and would be near impossible to collect reliably.  A poorly funded but long-term program might
have little impact but, in general, programs with longer duration have likely succeeded in
mobilizing more resources.
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Table 3 identifies the top 10 MSAs in terms of their cumulative years of experience with
each of these seven high technology programs as of 1990.  Some MSAs, such as Boston, MA
and Albany, NY have longstanding public venture capital programs.  Minneapolis, MN leads in
SBIR experience, Little Rock, AR and Boston, MA in technology grant and loans, Raleigh-
Durham, NC in technology development, Augusta, GA in technology deployment/transfer, and
Philadelphia, PA in technology business incubators and research parks.
(Table 3 about here)
Table 4 lists the top 20 MSAs in terms of the sum of all program years of experience.
Raleigh-Durham, NC is the leader, with over 152 cumulative years of high technology program
experience, followed by Philadelphia, PA (125 years), Augusta, GA (116 years) and Pittsburgh
PA (81 years).  The mix of these programs varies significantly, with Raleigh-Durham having
more technology development and deployment/transfer programs and Philadelphia having more
incubator and research park experience.  Over 54 percent of all our 291 MSAs have at least one
year of program experience and 27 of our MSAs had 5 or more high technology programs
operating in 1990.  We now turn to our method for analyzing the effects of these programs and
location/agglomeration advantages on the growth of high technology industry employment.
(Table 4 about here)
METHOD AND DATA
Model.
 The main question facing policy makers is how to generate high technology industry
employment net of existing employment levels.  To address this, we use a conditional change
design (Finkel 1995: 6-9) in which the dependent variable is the first difference change in the
number of high technology industry jobs, which is regressed on the lagged endogenous variable
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(i.e. high technology industry employment in 1988) and a set of additional independent variables.
There are also theoretical reasons for this design.  The initial starting point of high technology
industry employment is likely to affect subsequent change, either facilitating growth due to the
location and agglomeration advantages associated with existing high technology industry or,
alternatively, by capturing factors (e.g. diffusion, overbid wages) that geographically disperse
high technology employment over time.  This design also reduces the vulnerability to serially
correlated measurement errors, which should be captured by the lagged endogenous term.  We
measure independent variables at the starting point or as near as possible with one
exception—contemporaneous population change—which is introduced as an exogenous control
variable.
 Our model is as follows:
( Yt2 -  Yt1 ) =  _0  +  _1  (Yt1)  +   _2  (Xt1) +   _3  (Zt2 - Zt1)  +   ....   +   _        
where Yt2 -  Yt1  represents the first difference change in high technology employment, Yt1 is high
technology employment in 1988, Xt1 independent variables measured at or near 1988, Zt2 - Zt1
independent variables that changes concurrently over the period in question (i.e. 1988-1998), and
_  is an error term.5   To capture the contextual effects of policies in favorable agglomeration
contexts, we also add to this equation interactions between policy measures and agglomeration
variables net of the respective main effects of said policies and agglomeration variables.
We first control for location and agglomeration factors and then add the cumulative years
for each type of high technology program.  High technology programs need time to generate
significant employment.  We therefore use the cumulative years of program experience for each
policy type through 1990.  We address two key questions about these policies:  (1) Do high
technology policies have a direct impact net of location and agglomeration factors?  (2) Do these
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policies magnify local agglomeration processes?  These programs often are presented as
substituting for agglomeration factors by growing new industries and employment in areas that
previously lacked them.  This should be indicated by significant positive effects of policy scale
net of controls for location and agglomeration factors.  Programs are also seen as magnifying
local innovation capacities.  This should be evident from positive interactions between
agglomeration contexts (including existing high technology industry employment) and policies.  
Measurement.
Table 5 provides a correlation matrix and descriptive statistics for all our variables.  As
discussed above, our dependent measure is the first difference change score in the number of
private sector high technology industry jobs between 1988 and 1998.  The mean change in high
technology industry jobs is 2,277.8.  As noted, this measure has the greatest salience to policy-
makers and the general public for evaluating high technology policies.  High technology industry
employment in 1988 is introduced as a lagged endogenous control throughout.  Both
employment measures are moderately skewed, as are several of our independent measures.  We
also tested models using natural log transformations of all independent measures skewed 3.0 or
more and obtained the same significant predictors.  We present the unlogged results because they
provide interpretable partial slopes indicating the number of jobs created by specific independent
variables as well as interpretable adjusted R2 statistics.6
(Table 5 about here)
To capture location factors that may be attracting high technology industries, we use the
following:  (1) the 1988 mean wages of high technology industry jobs; (2) median housing costs;
(3) climate quality; (4) recreational amenities; (5) arts amenities; (5) airport access (the number
of daily air flights); (6) freeway access (the number of federal interstates highways in the
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metropolitan area); (7) market centrality based on population density in 1990 (U.S. Bureau of the
Census 1991); (8) higher education options (the number of 4-year colleges and universities); and
(9) the percentage black population.  Mean high technology industry wages are derived from the
CES data, and population density and the percent black from the U.S. Bureau of the Census
(1991).  All other measures come from Boyer and Savageau (1989).
Agglomeration advantages are measured by:  (1) population density in 1990 (U.S. Bureau
of the Census 1991); (2) the number of Fortune 500 manufacturing headquarters (1989); (3) the
number of private venture capital corporations in 1987-88 (Morris and Isenstein 1989); (4)
university R&D expenditures for 1990 (based on the earliest available data on the top 100
universities in terms of R&D expenditure in the National Science Foundation’s (2002)
WebCASPAR database:  www.nsf.gov/sbs/srs); and (5) federal and military research facilities
(as gauged by the mean of the 1980 and 1990 square meters of research space operated by the
Defense Dept., NASA, NIH and the nuclear arms labs [Hooks 2003]).  As noted earlier, we
include population density in both location and agglomeration equations since it taps both
dimensions.  To capture exogenous uncontrolled growth factors, we also introduce percent
population change between 1990 and 1997 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2000).  We use two-
tailed tests of significance and inspect all equations for multicollinearity using variance inflation
and tolerance statistics, finding no evidence of problems.
We also tested for influential outliers by identifying MSAs with a standardized residual
of 3.0 or more and the use of standard outlier diagnostics (Bollen and Jackman 1985) applied to
the full Model 6 in Table 6.  This identified five outliers as potential influential cases.  Detroit
Michigan proved to be an influential case with respect to technology development programs.7
We therefore remove Detroit from the regression results shown below, making our regression
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sample 290.  We also added a set of dummy variables representing the U.S. Census regions to
our full model 6 to test for omitted variables.  None of these regional dummy variables were
statistically significant.  How do these factors affect high technology employment change?
RESULTS
Our main regression results are presented in Table 6.  The lagged endogenous control is
not significant (Model 1), indicating little effect of the startpoint number of high technology
industry jobs.  The adjusted R2 of .001 provides a baseline for comparing subsequent models.
(Table 6 about here)
In Model 2, the lagged endogenous term, mean high technology wages, a favorable
climate and the number of daily air flights are significant predictors in the predicted direction.
This suggests that wages are encouraging the dispersion of high technology industry.  The
number of 4-year colleges and universities is significantly negative, the opposite found by
Markusen et al. (1986: 155).  We suspect this reflects the fact that the majority of these schools
are liberal arts colleges with little direct impact on high technology development.  It may also
reflect the post-1960s growth in higher education where 4-year colleges are no longer critical
amenities, especially relative to research universities.  Later we introduce the more meaningful
university R&D measure.  Population density is not significant.  Percent black is also not
significant, suggesting that the industry avoidance of larger minority populations earlier found by
Markusen et al. (1986: 155) may have dissipated.  We substituted a percent Hispanic and percent
black/Hispanic measure for our measure of percent black but neither effect was statistically
significant.  Location factors contribute 18.7 percent to explained variance (adjusted R2 = .188)
over the baseline model.
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Model 3 controls for agglomeration factors, showing that, in addition to a negative effect
of the endogenous lag term, Fortune 500 headquarters, university R&D, and military R&D
positively affect change in high technology industry employment.  These effects point to the
importance of entrepreneurial resources and public sector R&D investments and resemble
Markusen et al.’s (1986: 154-56) findings that large manufacturing corporate headquarters and
military spending contribute to high technology employment growth.  Population density and
private venture firms are not significant.  In Model 4 we add population change, which is
positive and significant but does not alter any of the other factors.  This suggests that other
factors associated with population growth do not alter the effects in Model 3.  The agglomeration
factors in Model 3 add 17.9 percent in explained variance over the baseline model.
Model 5 examines the effects of our policy measures.  In addition to the negative effect
of the endogenous lag term, technology grants and loans, business incubators and research parks
contribute to high technology industry job growth.  Public venture capital, SBIRs, technology
development and technology deployment/transfer programs are not statistically significant.
Programs associated with both the infrastructure (business incubators, research parks) and
entrepreneurial strategies (technology grants and loans) are effective at promoting high
technology employment growth.  At the same time, these results raise questions about the
efficacy of the other four programs.  We also obtained the same pattern of significant factors
using simpler models with each policy measure introduced individually along with the
endogenous lag term (results are available from the authors).  Compared to the baseline model,
high technology policies added 10.0 percent to explained variance.
Model 6 combines all the significant location and agglomeration variables with the seven
policy measures to see whether high technology development policies affect high technology
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employment growth net of location and agglomeration factors.  In addition to the location and
agglomeration factors, technology grants and loans and research parks have positive independent
effects on high technology industry job change.  The partial slopes in this equation indicate that
each additional grant and loan program year creates 2,666 high technology jobs and each
additional year of research parks creates an additional 364 high technology jobs.  Business
incubators lose significance due to a moderate correlation with Fortune 500 headquarters (r =
.39).  When Fortune 500 headquarters are removed from this equation, the incubators effect is
positive and significant (b = 680.8; t = 2.688), suggesting that their direct benefits are associated
with the presence of Fortune headquarters.
In addition to the lagged endogenous terms, a favorable climate, air flights, Fortune 500
headquarters, university R&D and military R&D still contribute to high technology industry job
growth.  The strongest standardized coefficients in this equation are the endogenous lag term (-
.76), Fortune 500 headquarters (.49), and air flights (.35) followed by technology grant and loan
programs (.24), military R&D and climate (both .16), and research parks (.15), indicating that
agglomeration factors are the dominant forces behind high technology growth.  These factors add
36.3 percent in explained variance to the base model.  Removing population density and
population change from this equation does not affect any of the other results.
Do these programs magnify or compensate for the agglomeration factors?  To examine
this, we test interaction terms between our seven policy measures and our agglomeration factors.
We also include interactions with daily air flights (a facilitator of agglomeration, see Irwin and
Kasarda 1991), population density, and 1988 high technology employment along with the major
agglomeration measures.  Since population change is an exogenous control, it is not combined in
interactions but is retained as a control in the models.  If the interaction term is positive, policies
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are magnifying the agglomeration effect by creating greater positive change in high technology
industry job growth.  If the interaction is negative, policies are compensating for lower levels of
agglomeration by generating high technology employment growth.  In addition to significant
interaction terms, the main effects may remain significant, indicating that a policy or
agglomeration factor has a direct effect in addition to its contribution in a significant interaction
term (see Jaccard, Turrisi and Wan 1990; Aiken and West 1991).  If only the interaction term
and neither of the main effects are significant, the policy benefits are limited to specific
agglomeration contexts.  We use centered measures throughout to reduce multicolinearity
between the main effects and the interaction terms (Aiken and West 1991: 32-35).  We add each
interaction term separately to the variables in Model 6 of Table 6 with the other policy measures
removed to reduce the risk of multicolinearity.  Model 7 in Table 6 shows the first of these 42
equations.  To save space, Table 7 summarizes the results, presenting only the coefficients,
standard errors and T-statistics for the interaction terms and for the main effects plus the adjusted
R2 (full equation results are available from the authors).
(Table 7 about here)
With the exception of SBIRs that do not produce significant interactions, all of the high
technology policies have an impact in at least two or more contexts.  In several of these
equations, the main effect for policy is not significant, indicating that the agglomeration context
specifies the setting where these policies are more effective.  In others, both main effects and the
interaction term is positive, indicating that the policy and the agglomeration context continue to
have effects in addition to the combination of policy with the context.
Public venture capital programs had no statistically significant effects in our earlier
equations but these programs contribute to high technology industry employment growth in all of
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our agglomeration contexts, including more densely populated MSAs.  In MSAs with significant
military R&D, these programs help compensate for agglomeration deficits.  Four of these
contexts—air flights, Fortune 500 headquarters, military R&D and existing high technology
industry—are additively significant alongside the interaction effect.
High technology grant and loan programs interact positively with all the agglomeration
contexts and, in five of these contexts, work additively in addition to interactively combining
with agglomeration contexts to boost high technology industry employment.  Fortune 500
headquarters and initial high technology industry employment also work additively in these
equations.  Overall, grant and loan programs appear to be one of the most consistently beneficial
high technology policies.
Technology development programs interact negatively with several agglomeration
contexts, indicating contexts in which these programs compensate for agglomeration deficits.
Negative interactions with air flights, population density, Fortune 500 headquarters, and initial
high technology industry employment indicate that technology development programs are
compensating for initial agglomeration deficits in these contexts.  The main effects for air flights,
Fortune 500 headquarters, university R&D, and military R&D are positive in these equations,
indicating that these factors still contribute to high technology industry employment growth.
Technology deployment and transfer programs are not statistically significant in the
earlier equations but they do increase high technology industry employment in conjunction with
private venture capital and initial high technology industry employment.  Since these programs
do not generate new technology but rather attempt to insure that “state of the art” technology is
being utilized, this suggests that these contexts maximize the employment benefits of technology
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deployment and transfer programs by accelerating the adoption of current technology.  In both
contexts, the main effect of the agglomeration context is also statistically significant.
The two strongest “technopole” factors—technology business incubators and research
parks--contribute to high technology job growth in all agglomeration contexts except for military
R&D centers for incubators.  In the incubator equations with air flights and Fortune 500
headquarters, the main effect of incubators is negative and significant, suggesting that incubators
do not stimulate high-technology employment growth outside of MSAs with air hubs and
Fortune 500 headquarters.  Both “technopole” policies, the main effects of air flights, Fortune
500 headquarters and initial high technology industry employment also retain their statistical
significance in these interaction equations.
Overall, these interactions indicate that both the infrastructural and entrepreneurial
strategies are conditioned in their effects by the presence of agglomeration advantages.  The
critics of high technology policy are correct that high technology development is an organic
process that cannot be planned from scratch.  Existing agglomeration advantages are important to
securing benefits from these policies.  In a few contexts, policies compensate for agglomeration
deficits.  At the same time, the limits of these technology policies should not be overstated.
Some of these policies—technology grants and loans, incubators, and research parks—have
independent effects net of favorable agglomeration contexts and interactions among these.  The
best formula appears to be using both infrastructural and entrepreneurial policies by adapting
them to complement existing local innovation capacities, thereby magnifying the effects of
agglomeration advantages.  Technology development programs are distinctive in compensating
for agglomeration deficits.  We find no evidence that the centralized or the decentralized
approach is inherently superior.  Multiple policies drawing on both approaches are effective,
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especially when they complement existing high technology resources or compensate for initial
disadvantages.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY
       Our results support the argument that federal, state and local high technology policies are
contributing to high technology development and the creation of “good jobs.”  Although in
compositional terms, high technology industry employment did not grow as rapidly as other
industrial sectors during the 1988-1998 decade, it is a major source of “good jobs” that pay a
third or more greater than jobs in other industries and is a central motor of national economic
growth.  States and localities in partnership with federal programs have initiated a range of new
programs to enhance local innovation capacity and to create new “technopoles” in specific
locales.
Of these new high technology policies, technology grant and loan programs and research
parks have been the most effective in promoting high technology industry employment growth.
Technology grant and loan programs represent the core of a decentralized entrepreneurial
approach, funding the development of new products and associated technologies proposed by
existing enterprises and would-be entrepreneurs.  Research parks represent the core of a
centralized “technopole” approach that provides infrastructure for the creation of new high
technology industry.  By drawing on both approaches and recognizing the need for policy to
complement existing agglomeration advantages, states and local governments have increased
high technology industry employment.
Our results support the idea that high technology development is an organic, path-
dependent process while, at the same time, showing that governmental planning can accelerate
this process.  The major driving forces behind high technology development are underlying
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location and agglomeration factors, especially Fortune 500 headquarters, air hub centrality and
university/military R&D.  High technology policies independently have only a modest effect on
high technology industry growth.  At the same time, several of these policies work independently
and interactively with existing agglomeration advantages.  In this sense, high technology
development can be planned.  This planning process needs to take into account existing
locational and agglomeration strengths and deficits.  While we have not examined the details of
this planning process, it is clear that high technology programs need to be adapted to the existing
mix of high technology industry, locational and agglomeration resources.  Processes that
facilitate this policy adjustment, such as industry-government advisory boards, the use of
nonprofit corporations and other policy tools, may contribute to policy effectiveness.  High
technology industry cannot be created entirely from scratch but, at the same time, it can be aided
by effective policy.
Our results also suggest specific ways that these policies work.  Business incubators
attempt to create new enterprises that eventually mature and relocate nearby.  While business
incubators do not have direct effects net of controls for locational and agglomeration factors,
they do magnify the benefits from favorable agglomeration contexts, including the initial level of
high technology industry.  The lack of a favorable interaction with military R&D probably
reflects the national security constraints that have traditionally restricted commercial spin-offs
from military R&D facilities.  The recent establishment of business incubator programs at
several military R&D labs and relaxed commercialization restrictions on military research may
alter this in the future.
Public venture capital programs attempt to reduce the capital gap for risky new
enterprises by investing state funds (including employee pension funds) in new companies and
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products on an equity, royalty or convertible debenture basis.  These programs do not directly
contribute to high technology growth by themselves but, in favorable agglomeration contexts,
boost high technology employment.  Most states have a single public venture capital program
headquartered in or nearby the state capital, raising the possibility that these programs have
direct benefits throughout the state rather than in the immediate MSA in which they are located.8
Further analysis at a state level is needed to assess this possibility.
Technology development programs attempt to spin off new technologies from basic
research for eventual commercialization.  Partially reflecting the long lead-time required and the
geographic portability of new technical knowledge generated in these types of programs, these
programs do not have significant additive effects.  They do, however, compensate for initial
deficits in high technology agglomeration resources.
Technology deployment and transfer programs are designed to make “state of the art”
technology available to existing industry.  Unlike these other programs, their object is to insure
that the best available technology is utilized instead of generating new technologies.  In view of
this limitation, it is not surprising that these programs do not independently generate high
technology employment growth.  Nonetheless, in MSAs with greater private venture capital
firms and prior concentrations of high technology industry, these programs have positive effects
on high technology industry employment growth.
The conventional debate over infrastructural vs. entrepreneurial approaches to high
technology development appears misguided.  Some have argued for major infrastructural
initiatives to create “technopoles” and new “Silicon Valleys.”  Critics correctly point out that this
strategy is unlikely to work by itself and that the informal networks, entrepreneurial traditions,
skilled labor and tacit knowledge bases that are critical to high technology development cannot
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be planned.  However, government policies can nurture these local contexts where agglomeration
processes are already in place.  Hence a “technopole” strategy has to be adapted to fit the local
strengths and weaknesses of existing high technology resources.  At the same time, this approach
needs to be balanced by more decentralized policies, such as public venture capital and
technology grant and loan programs that depend on the initiative of existing enterprises and
would-be entrepreneurs.
We also find support for existing arguments about the importance of location and
agglomeration advantages.  Numerous studies have discussed the importance of the R&D
spillovers from large Fortune 500 companies, research universities and military research labs
(Markusen et al. 1986; Saxenian 1994; Kenney 2000; Lee et al. 2000; Hooks 2003; Goldstein
and Renault 2004).  Others have pointed to the advantages of a good climate (Markusen et al.
1986) and centrality within the air transport system (Irwin and Kasarda 1991).  Much of this
literature has relied on case studies to demonstrate the plausible link between existing public and
private sector R&D and the creation of new high technology firms, patents and regional
industrial clusters.  Little of this work has used systematic comparison and multivariate controls.
Our contribution has been to use these techniques to gauge the relative contribution of these
factors on high technology employment growth.  Local agglomeration networks and institutions
create local capacities for innovation that are central to high technology development.  In this
sense, high technology industry is locality based.  It requires a local innovation capacity that
sustains the continuous creation of new enterprises and technologies, including business restarts
and the recycling of technology.  At the same time, policies adapted to complement existing high
technology strengths may magnify the benefits of these advantages and, for technology
development policy, compensate for initial agglomeration deficits.
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Do these policies constitute a sharp break with traditional industrial recruitment policies?
Many analysts have promoted the new technology policies as alternatives to traditional industrial
recruitment, arguing that they allow states and localities to “grow their own” new industry
(Osborne 1988; Eisinger 1988; Clarke and Gaile 1989, 1998).  In this sense, these policies
parallel the adoption of export-led development strategies in less developed countries in which
the state plays an entrepreneurial function by directly intervening to promote new technology
and industrial development (Evans 1995).  High technology programs do differ from traditional
industrial recruitment in requiring greater targeting and direct participation by state and local
governments in the development of new technology, products, markets and enterprises.  Yet this
distinction should not be overstated.  The benefits of these policies depend on favorable
agglomeration contexts.  High technology policies helped build on existing high technology
industry and, for the most part, do not create new industries from scratch.  In this sense, high
technology policies may be seen as a more sophisticated form of industrial recruitment and
retention, allowing areas with existing agglomeration and location advantages to capitalize on
their assets.  Future research should examine the overall effects of growing inequalities in
agglomeration advantages and the policy options for addressing the new inequalities associated
with regional disparities in high technology development.
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Table 1.  High Technology Industry Employment Change, 1988-1998.
Top 20 High Technology Industry Job Gainers:
       # High Tech.      High Tech.    Change High
          Industry            Industry    Tech. Industry
MSA Name          Jobs 1988        Jobs 1998      Jobs 1988-1998
1. Chicago IL                                         73,115 302,108 128,993
2. Washington, DC-MD-VA                          191,979 288,469    96,490
3. Boston-Lawrence-Salem MA        290,423 350,583    60,160
4. Houston TX                                            83,822 139,978    56,156
5. Rochester, NY                                        19,976    75,063    55,087
6. Atlanta, GA                                            93,750 144,485    50,735
7. Portland OR                                           40,295    83,865    43,570
8. Dallas, TX                                                    151,510  192,682   41,172
9. New Haven-Waterbury-Meriden CT            34,226    74,514   40,288
10. San Francisco CA                                    56,315    95,674   39,359
11. San Jose CA                                      267,542  302,176   34,634
12. Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI                 130,077  160,211   30,134
13. Oakland CA                                          67,746     95,993   28,247
14. Newark NJ                                             57,338     85,200   27,862
15. Austin, TX                                             35,568     62,679   27,111
16. Dayton-Springfield, OH                             28,846     52,912   24,066
17. Raleigh-Durham, NC                                 36,191     59,426   23,235
18. Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT                         29,535     52,679   23,144
19. Wichita, KS                                            6,399     28,422   22,023
20. Cleveland OH                                        70,744     91,438   20,694
Top 20 High Technology Industry Job Losers:
      # High Tech.        # High Tech.   Change High
          Industry             Industry       Tech. Industry
MSA Name        Jobs 1988             Jobs 1998     Jobs 1988-1998
1. Los Angeles-Long Beach CA                   499,945             351,000 -148,945
2. Detroit, MI                                     258,553 121,456 -137,097
3. Seattle WA                                        148,797     97,474    -51,323
4. Hartford-New Britain-Middletown CT        79,946     39,580    -40,366
5. Nassau-Suffolk NY                                 119,528     80,212    -39,316
6. Bergen-Passaic, NJ                                  82,559     55,008    -27,551
7. Baltimore, MD                                        66,927     46,312    -20,615
8. Flint, MI                                           34,953     15,879    -19,074
9. Fort Worth-Arlington, TX                          65,762     47,703    -18,059
10. Lansing-East Lansing, MI                          23,905        7,523    -16,382
11. St. Louis, MO-IL                                  112,196      95,883   -16,313
12. Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA-NJ       25,464         9,819   -15,645
13. Saginaw-Bay City-Midland, MI                   18,500         5,041   -13,459
14. Peoria, IL                                             16,364         3,106   -13,258
15. Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY                           35,614     23,262   -12,352
16. Binghamton, NY                                       15,501         4,178   -11,323
17. Ann Arbor MI                                        28,096     17,289   -10,807
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18. Syracuse, NY                                         23,618     13,430   -10,188
19. Richland-Kennewick-Pasco, WA             12,420         2,864     -9,556
20. Melbourne-Titusville-Palm Bay, FL          39,269     29,762     -9,507
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Table 2:  High Technology Programs Inside and Outside of MSAs, 1990.
# Programs # Programs      Total
in MSAs Outside MSAs   Programs
Public Venture Capital         20     2        22
SBIRs         17     9        26
Technology Grants & Loans         16     5        21
Technology Development        94    15      109
Technology Deployment/Transfer     77    23      100
Technology Incubators     137    41           178
Research Parks      99    18      117
Total     460  114      573
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Table 3.  Top 10 MSAs in Total Cumulative Years of Experience with High Technology Programs,
1990.
Public Venture Capital Programs:
Boston-Lawrence-Salem-Lowell MA         19
Albany-SchenectadyTroy, NY                           8
Hartford-New Britain-Middletown CT        8
Madison, WI                                          7
Indianapolis, IN                                     7
Lansing-East Lansing, MI                             7
Philadelphia, PA                                      6
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA-NJ                   6
Portland OR                                         5
Little Rock AR                    5
SBIR Programs:
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN           18
Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT               7
Boise City, ID                                       7
Houston TX                                          5
Columbus OH                                         5
Charleston WV                                       4
Billings MT                                         4
Hartford-New Britain-Middletown CT         3
Little Rock AR                    3
Baton Rouge LA                                     2
Technology Grant & Loan Programs:
Little Rock AR                  14
Boston-Lawrence-Salem-Lowell MA 14
Indianapolis IN             9
Topeka KS                                           9
Salt Lake City-Ogden UT                             7
Montgomery AL                                       6
Washington, DC-MD-VA                                5
Anchorage AK                                        4
Austin TX                                           4
Oklahoma City OK                                    1
Technology Development Programs:
Raleigh-Durham NC                                 48
Great Falls MT                                    29
Detroit MI                                        23
Lincoln NE                                        21
Middlesex-Somerset NJ                  20
Ann Arbor MI                                      19
Akron OH                                         18
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Salt Lake City-Ogden UT                           16
Orlando, FL                                        13
Dayton-Springfield OH                             12
Technology Deployment/Transfer Programs:
Augusta GA-SC                                     116
Raleigh-Durham NC                                   69
Macon-Warner Robins GA                              58
Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill NC-SC    43
Atlanta GA                                          29
Columbus GA-AL                                      29
Albany GA                                           29
Athens GA                                           29
Savannah GA                                         29
 Philadelphia PA                                    27
High Technology Business Incubators:
Philadelphia PA                                   43
Pittsburgh PA                                      41
Buffalo-Niagara Falls NY                           25
Chicago IL                                         22
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI                        16
Boston-Lawrence-Salem-Lowell MA      15
Syracuse NY                                        15
Toledo OH                                          12
Albany-Schenectady-Troy NY                          10
Dayton-Springfield OH                              10
High Technology Research Parks:
Philadelphia PA                                   43
Oklahoma City OK                                 40
San Jose CA                                        39
Richland-Kennewick-Pasco WA                       36
Raleigh-Durham NC                                  31
Washington, DC-MD-VA                               30
Lafayette-West Lafayette IN                        29
Huntsville AL                                      28
Champaign-Urbana IL                       27
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater FL                26
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Table 6.  Unstandardized Coefficients, Standardized Coefficients (and Standard Errors) from
Regression of High Technology Industry Employment Change, 1988-1998.
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
(Constant) 2448.75 15763.94 1723.27 -1157.83 622.40 2752.32 5319.51




























-- -- -- -- --
Median Housing Cost 1989 -- 20.01
.04
(32.12)
-- -- -- -- --
Climate Index 1988 -- 32.83**
.21
(9.36)






Recreation Index 1988 -- 2.14
.01
(11.27)
-- -- -- -- --
Arts Index 1988 -- -18.80
-.10
(15.34)
-- -- -- -- --
# Daily Air Flights 1988 -- 40.50***
.43
(7.43)






# Interstates 1988 -- 1382.51
.07
(1324.73)
-- -- -- -- --
# 4 Year Higher Education Institutions -- -832.11**
-.08
(268.48)
-- -- -- -- --
Percent Black 1989 -- 122.68
.07
(95.14)
-- -- -- -- --



























































































































Centered Interaction of Public Venture




Number of Cases 290 290 290 290 290 290 290
Adjusted R2 .001 .188 .180 .200 .101 .364 .367
*** p < .001,  ** p < .01, * < .05  (two-tailed tests); standardized coefficients are in italics, standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 7. Unstandardized Coefficients and Standard Errors from Regression of Policy/Agglomeration
Interactions on High Technology Employment Change, 1988-98  (Centered Measures; N = 290).
______________________________________________________________________________________________
Interaction Variable eCoefficient S.E. Main Effects Coefficient S. E. Adj. R2
Public Venture Capital:
Public Venture * Air Flights 11.21*** 2.32 Public Venture -292.86 702.52 .367
Air Flights 41.53*** 6.46
Public Venture * Pop. Density 3.69*** .872 Public Venture 138.44 681.18 .356
Pop. Density -.660 1.304
Public Venture * Fortune 500 408.36*** 100.73 Public Venture 177.85 687.26 .352
Fortune 500 1996.42*** 275.25
Public Venture* Private Venture 109.02*** 19.89 Public Venture 420.53 597.38 .381
Private Venture 52.46 37.11
Public Venture * Univ. R&D .009*** .002 Public Venture -717.495 706.891 .383
University R&D .001 .010
Public Venture * Military R&D -24.84* 10.359 Public Venture 1920.266*** 560.451 .328
Military R&D 73.008** 18.565
Public Venture * HT Employment .019*** .004 Public Venture -428.978 708.185 .370
HT Employment -.289*** .031
SBIRs:
SBIRs * Air Flights 7.108 4.18 SBIR -890.477 1177.481 .298
Air Flights 34.022*** 6.666
SBIRs * Population Density 2.426 4.047 SBIR 665.235 682.823 .292
Pop. Density -1.469 1.580
SBIRs * Fortune 500 74.782 83.790 SBIR 53.790 1039.460 .293
Fortune 500 1655.715*** 286.585
SBIRs * Private Venture 97.364 91.805 SBIR 545.045 692.303 .294
Private Venture 27.161 43.039
SBIRs * University R&D .003 .006 SBIR 186.075 1081.846 .292
University R&D .016 .011
SBIRs * Military R&D 74.344 77.393 SBIR 630.364 674.995 .294
Military R&D 78.625** 25.038
SBIR *  HT Employment .006 .012 SBIR 325.287 1076.721 .292
HT Employment -.231*** .032
Technology Grants and Loans:
Grants/Loans * Air Flights 17.481*** 2.479 Grants/Loans 742.757 598.887 .448
Air Flights 42.254*** 5.993
Grants/Loans * Pop. Density 5.875*** .940 Grants/Loans 1750.425** 555.282 .429
Pop. Density -.539 1.215
Grants/Loans * Fortune 500 707.583*** 112.116 Grants/Loans 1877.494*** 547.973 .431
Fortune 500 2297.069*** 262.876
Grants/Loans  * Private Venture 135.438*** 23.782 Grants/Loans 2202.682*** 543.785 .417
Private Venture 50.214 35.948
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Grants/Loans  * Univ. R&D .011*** .002 Grants/Loans 1228.457* 592.179 .426
University R&D -.003 .010
Grants/Loans * Military R&D 36.485*** 7.031 Grants/Loans 2550.785*** 539.080 .407
Military R&D 22.630 18.898
Grants/Loans  * HT Employment .028*** .004 Grants/Loans 1011.784 599.825 .432
HT Employment -.304*** .029
Technology Development:
Development * Air Flights -3.148* 1.385 Development -6.311 204.309 .302
Air Flights 33.224*** 6.613
Development * Pop. Density -2.949*** .473 Development -103.945 185.515 .376
Pop. Density -5.680*** 1.368
Development * Fortune 500 -570.350*** 73.569 Development -491.480** 185.289 .415
Fortune 500 2912.108*** 300.355
Development * Private Venture .031 5.361 Development -136.281 198.775 .289
Private Venture 7.686 40.204
Development * Univ. R&D .001 .001 Development 58.133 252.511 .293
University R&D .021 .011
Development * Military R&D -.334 3.918 Development -137.179 198.150 .289
Military R&D 63.644*** 24.955
Development * HT Employment -.024** .008 Development -4.046 198.407 .315
HT Employment -.254*** .032
Technology Deployment/
Transfer:
Deployment/Trans. * Air Flights .350 .442 Deployment/Trans -8.627 82.922 .289
Air Flights 31.926*** 6.831
Deployment/Trans. * Pop. Den. .241 .428 Deployment/Trans 21.475 97.745 .289
Pop. Density -1.425 1.779
Deployment/Trans. * Fortune 500 9.778 29.826 Deployment/Trans -1.892 84.815 .288
Fortune 500 1742.342*** 288.231
Deploy./Trans. * Private Venture 41.696* 16.841 Deployment/Trans 297.067* 147.942 .303
Private Venture 127.555* 62.422
Deployment/Trans. * Univ. R&D .000 .001 Deployment/Trans -19.006 84.557 .289
University R&D .013 .012
Deployment /Trans. * Mil. R&D 2.863 2.064 Deployment/Trans 11.343 83.845 .293
Military R&D 52.474** 19.970
Deployment/Trans. * HT Emp. .007** .003 Deployment/Trans 2.461 81.823 .309
High Tech Emp. -.225*** .031
Technology Incubators:
Incubators * Air Flights 3.335*** .678 Incubators -555.311* 264.739 .348
Air Flights 23.818*** 6.652
Incubators * Pop. Density 1.320*** .240 Incubators -324.054 229.873 .361
Pop. Density -2.317 1.257
Incubators * Fortune 500 120.245*** 23.260 Incubators -589.137* 263.161 .354
Fortune 500 1273.843*** 284.530
43
Incubators * Private Venture 46.615*** 11.967 Incubators 61.525 214.956 .328
Private Venture 65.971 40.623
Incubators * Univ. R&D .005*** .001 Incubators -469.760 261.827 .341
University R&D .007 .011
Incubators * Military R&D -1.732 1.863 Incubators 367.615 238.860 .294
Military R&D 69.698*** 21.550
Incubators * HT Employment .007** .002 Incubators -209.383 261.297 .315
HT Employment -.266*** .033
Research Parks:
Parks * Air Flights 2.778*** .687 Parks 173.169 134.926 .342
Air Flights 22.403*** 6.876
Parks * Pop. Density 1.357*** .263 Parks 234.880 128.240 .364
Pop. Density 1.778 1.454
Parks * Fortune 500 167.653*** 25.233 Parks 75.701 129.276 .399
Fortune 500 1322.359*** 267.656
Parks * Private Venture 21.845*** 4.151 Parks 235.180 127.966 .366
Private Venture 11.878 36.953
Parks * University R&D .002* .001 Parks 238.215 140.087 .313
University R&D .006 .011
Parks * Military R&D 5.811*** 1.276 Parks 153.414 133.998 .352
Military R&D -7.726 22.732
Parks * HT Employment .010*** .002 Parks -37.765 134.910 .401
HT Employment -.346*** .033
_________________________________________________________________________________________________
* p <  .05   ** p < .01    ***  p < .001   (two-tailed tests).
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Endnotes
                                                        
1.  See also the refinement by Chapple, Markusen and Schrock (2004), which emphasizes the mix of
R&D occupations to capture high technology industry.
2.  An exploratory principal components analysis of the first difference change scores for MSA
high technology employment using the three measures of high technology industry employment
proposed by Markusen et al. (1987), Hadlock et al. (1991), Hecker (1999) and Chapple,
Markusen and Schrock (2004) loaded on the same vector, indicating that these alternative
operationalizations are measuring the same underlying construct.
3.  The Standard Industrial Classification codes for high tech industries based on the 1987
Standard Industrial Classification Manual are as follows:  281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287,
289, 291, 348, 351, 353, 355, 356, 357, 361, 362, 365, 371, 366, 367, 372, 376, 381, 382, 384,
386, 737, 873, 871, and 874 (see Hecker 1999: 20-21).
4.  Although the CEW Program (ES-202) does provide county-level employment estimates,
which could be used to measure high technology employment in counties that moved in or out of
the MSA list due to U.S. Census revisions, we restricted our analysis to those MSAs that were in
both the 1980 and the 1990 Census list for several reasons.  First, only twenty-two units would
be added by this approach, representing less than four percent of total MSA population.  Second,
the suppression of CEW data at the 3 and 4-digit industry level due to confidentiality disclosure
restrictions would make their addition problematic.  These are relatively small labor markets
with more suppressed employment data, which might introduce error into the analysis.  Another
possibility is aggregating MSAs to the Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area (or CMSA)
level.  This does not seem advisable, however, because several of our independent measures are
not available for CMSA units.  Mean values for CMSA units might distort differences between,
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e.g. Los Angeles/Riverside CA and Santa Anna (Orange County) CA.  We instead used the
component PMSA (Primary Metropolitan Statistical Areas), providing more direct measurement
of several independent variables.  We also tested a dummy variable for PMSA units that were
components of CMSAs in our full equation but it was never statistically significant.
5.  We also ran these same models using a lagged panel design (i.e. predicting 1998 high
technology industry employment net of a control for the endogenous 1988 high technology
industry employment), obtaining the same pattern of significant predictors.  We present the
conditional change results because they provide interpretable partial slopes, standardized
coefficients and adjusted R2 estimates.
6.  In addition to log transformations, we also tested dummy variables representing the presence
(yes = 1; no = 0) of several skewed independent variables (Fortune 500 headquarters, private
venture capital firms, university R&D and federal/military R&D) as well as all seven policy
measures but the raw scores performed better in the regression analysis.  This suggests it is not
the simple presence of these policies or agglomeration factors but their magnitude that affects
high technology employment change.
7.  Detroit is influential outlier due to a large negative change in the number of high technology
industry jobs in the auto industry despite the existence of two longstanding technology
development programs—the Michigan Energy Research and Resource Association and the
Metropolitan Center for High Technology.  Both technology development programs were
focused on the local needs of the auto industry but during our period corporate restructuring of
automotive research and design created a major employment change.  We therefore removed
Detroit from our regression sample.
8.  We also tested dummy interactions between MSA state capitals and cumulative program
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duration adding to the base equation in Model 7, finding some evidence of benefits and losses to
capital cities.  The dummy variable representing state capitals was never significant in this or
simpler equations.  The dummy interaction was positive and significant for technology
incubators but negative and significant for grant and loan programs.  None of the other dummy
interactions were significant, including that for public venture capital programs.  Capital cities
may benefit more from incubators in their midst while loosing from grant and loan programs that
distribute most of their awards outside the state capital but otherwise there appears to be no
special job gain from being a state capital.
